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Appellate Division, First Department, recognizes an exception to
New York City's sovereign immunity
A municipality, generally, has no affirmative duty to provide
police protection 1 absent a special relationship between it and the
claimant.2 Thus, the New York City Transit Authority ("TA"), absent such special relationship, generally may not be held liable for
its failure to provide adequate police protection. This "immunity
1 Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 583, 240 N.E.2d 860, 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d
897, 899 (1968); see Gerald P. Krause, Comment, MunicipalLiability: The Failureto
Provide Adequate Police Protection - The Special Duty Doctrine Should Be Discarded, 1984 Wis. L. Rav. 499 (reviewing lack of municipal liability for failure to provide adequate police protection). The "purpose of the special duty rule [is] to rationally
limit [the] class of citizens to whom the municipality owes [a] duty of protection."
Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 74 N.Y.2d 251, 258, 543 N.E.2d 443, 447, 544 N.Y.S.2d
995, 999 (1989).
2 To establish the existence of a special relationship, the plaintiff must prove
(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an
affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge
on the part of the municipality's agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3)
some form of direct contact between the municipality's agents and the injured party; and (4) that party's justifiable reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking.
Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 260, 505 N.E.2d 937, 940,513 N.Y.S.2d 372,
375 (1987) (citations omitted). "The tort law analogy on which courts often rely is that
government will be charged with an affirmative duty to act only when it has first
placed an individual in a condition of helplessness or otherwise invited reliance on its
protection." Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution:A Critique,88 MICH. L. REV.
2271, 2293 (1990); see Joseph T. Bockrath, Annotation, Liability of Municipality or
Other Governmental Unit for Failure to Provide Police Protection, 46 A.L.R. 1084,
1091 (1972 & Supp. 1994) (recognizing exception to general rule of no liability where
special relationship is established).
3 Weiner v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 N.Y.2d 175, 433 N.E.2d 124, 448
N.Y.S.2d 141 (1982). In Weiner, the plaintiffs were assaulted in subway stations
where there had been evidence of previous attacks. Id. at 179-80, 433 N.E.2d at 126,
448 N.Y.S.2d at 143. During the approximately six months prior to the plaintiffs'
attacks, 13 separate incidents of robbery and assault occurred, eight of which were at
knife point. Id. at 179, 433 N.E.2d at 126, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 143. Plaintiffs argued that
the defendant was engaged in a proprietary function, similar to an owner of real property whose duty it is to protect the public from foreseeable harmful acts. Id. at 180,
433 N.E.2d at 126,448 N.Y.S.2d at 143. The defendant maintained that it exercised a
governmental function for which it is immune from liability absent the existence of a
special relationship. Id. The Weiner court rejected the analysis of both litigants, and
held that liability must be determined by:
the specific act or omission out of which the injury is claimed to have arisen
and the capacity in which that act or failure to act occurred ... [and] not
whether the agency involved is engaged generally in proprietary activity or
is in control of the location in which the injury occurred.
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. . rests upon the same considerations as the immunity of a municipality or other governmental body from liability for failure to
provide adequate police protection." 4 The amount of police protecId. at 182, 433 N.E.2d at 127, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 144 (citations omitted). The court then
determined that the plaintiffs' injuries arose out of an activity governmental in nature: an allocation of police resources and a legislative-executive decision. Id. Accordingly, the plaintiffs could not recover.
Two years later, however, the court in Miller v. State, 62 N.Y.2d 506, 467 N.E.2d
493, 478 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1984), applied the Weiner standard and held that the failure to
keep a dormitory locked fell within the state's proprietary function as landlord. Id.
The court then pronounced that "[a] governmental entity's conduct may fall along a
continuum of responsibility to individuals and society deriving from its governmental
and proprietary functions." Id. at 511-12, 467 N.E.2d at 496, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 832. See
Harry H. Lipsig, Victims of Subway Crimeand the Walls of Immunity, N.Y. L.J., May
31, 1990, at 3 (discussing how Weiner "established boundaries of this policy-based
governmental immunity").
Subsequent cases have utilized the test established in Weiner to determine the
scope of a municipality's immunity. See Kircher, 74 N.Y.2d at 255-56, 543 N.E.2d at
445, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 997 (requiring special relationship between municipality and
plaintiff before former may be held liable to latter for negligent exercise of governmental function as established in Weiner); Cuffy, 69 N.Y.2d at 260,505 N.E.2d at 939,
513 N.Y.S.2d at 374 (citing Weiner as general rule governing municipal liability);
Crosland v. New York City Transit Auth., 68 N.Y.2d 165, 170, 498 N.E.2d 143, 145,
506 N.Y.S.2d 670, 672 (1986) (concluding TA's liability for negligence depends upon
whether its act falls within scope of governmental immunity established in Weiner);
Miller, 62 N.Y.2d at 513, 467 N.E.2d at 497, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 833 (stating court should
apply Weiner when "the liability of a governmental entity is at issue"); Bardavid v.
New York City Transit Auth., 61 N.Y.2d 986, 987, 463 N.E.2d 1216, 1217, 475
N.Y.S.2d 364, 365 (1984) (quoting Weiner to support holding TA immune from liability absent special relationship between it and claimant); Belle v. New York City
Transit Auth., 157 Misc. 2d 76, 80, 595 N.Y.S.2d 856, 859 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993)
(indicating that Weiner established standard under which municipality may be held
liable where no special relationship exists); Popplestone v. New York City Transit
Auth., N.Y. L.J., Mar. 6, 1990, at 22, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Mar. 5, 1990) (citing
Weiner in suit against TA for TA's failure to provide adequate police protection).
4 Weiner, 55 N.Y.2d at 179,433 N.E.2d at 125,448 N.Y.S.2d at 142. Furthermore,
"[t]hat a nongovernmental common carrier would be liable under the same factual
circumstances is not determinative of the authority's liability." Id. at 178-79, 433
N.E.2d at 125, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 142. The TA performs a governmental function in
carrying out its corporate purposes and is authorized to maintain a transit police
force. N.Y. PuB. AuTH.LAw §§ 1202(2), 1204(16) (McKinney 1982).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity "precludtes] the institution of a suit against
the sovereign [government] without the sovereign's consent." BAmmON'S LAw DIcrioNARY 457 (3d ed. 1991). "[Oiriginally based on the maxim the King can do no wrong,'"
id., the doctrine prevails today on the rationale that "[the] sovereign is exempt from
suit.., on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907); see Sharon J. Kronish, Comment, Sovereign Immunity: A Modern Rationale in Light of the 1976 Amendments to the Administrative
ProcedureAct, 1981 DUKE L.J. 116 (discussing historical and modern rationales for
sovereign immunity doctrine). The immunity of the central government was extended
to municipalities in the landmark case of Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359
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tion a municipality should provide is a legislative-executive determination involving an allocation of a limited amount of resources. 5
Municipalities would potentially be exposed to unlimited liability
if the negligent failure to provide police protection gave rise to a
cause of action.6 To prevent the anticipated explosion of municipal liability, a large majority of courts have typically construed
the exception narrowly, 7 and denied recovery, concluding that no
such relationship existed between the TA and the victim.8 In a
few instances, however, courts have held the municipality liable
(KB. 1788). The court concluded that it is "better that an individual should sustain
an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience." Id. at 362.
5 Riss, 22 N.Y.2d at 581-82, 240 N.E.2d at 860-61, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 898. "[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely for its failure to provide adequate public services. The extent of public services afforded by a municipality is... limited by the
resources of the community. Deployment of these resources remains, as it must, a
legislative-executive decision.... ."Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 197-98, 375
N.E.2d 763, 767-68,404 N.Y.S.2d 583, 588 (1978); see Krause, supra note 1, at 501-04
(discussing public policy arguments against permitting individuals to maintain
claims against municipalities for their failure to provide adequate police protection).
6 Riss, 22 N.Y.2d at 581-82, 240 N.E.2d at 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 898-99; see
Bockrath, supra note 2. The courts established a rule of municipality immunity, fearing that a contrary rule would result in a" 'staggering potential liability.' "Id. at 1088
(quoting Massengill v. Yuma County, 456 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1969)). Statutes imposing a
police duty to protect citizens are not generally enforceable by individual citizens. Id.
at 1091. "Neglect in the performance of [police] requirements creates no civil liability
to individuals." Id. (citing King v. New York, 3 Misc. 2d 241, 245, 152 N.Y.S.2d 110,
114 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1956)).
This doctrine, also known as the public duty rule, dictates that the government
owes a duty to the public at large, rather than to specific individuals. See Riss, 22
N.Y.2d at 585, 240 N.E.2d at 862, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 901 (Keating, J., dissenting) (summarizing city's logic for immunity as: "Because we owe a duty to everybody, we owe it
to nobody."). This rule is based on the principle that a duty owed to the general public
should be enforceable only at the polls, not in the courts. Bandes, supra note 2, at
2328; cf. Elizabeth Kundinger Hocking, Federal Facility Violations of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act and the QuestionableRole of Sovereign Immunity, 5
Aumn. L.J. 203 (1991) (comparing conflicting policies concerning use of sovereign immunity to protect public treasury); Krause, supra note 1, at 499 (arguing that special
duty doctrine has historically been applied to limit liability and that doctrine should
be discarded and replaced by ordinary tort principles) (authored by former police
officer).
7 See Cuffy, 69 N.Y.2d at 260, 505 N.E.2d at 940, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 375 (indicating
that existence of requisite special relationship is rarely found); Bardavid v. New York
City Transit Auth., 61 N.Y.2d 986,463 N.E.2d 1216,475 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1984) (holding
that failure of electric sign normally used to instruct passengers to remain on public
thoroughfare until elevator arrives does not create special relationship). But see
Bockrath, supra note 2, at 1091-94 (providing examples of relationships that fall
within ambit of recognized exception to statutory immunity); see also infra note 10
(citing examples of governmental-propriety distinction).
8 See Bockrath, supra note 2, at 1091-94 (listing examples of cases applying
exception).
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for the assault of a passenger, despite the absence of a special relationship between the parties. 9 In such cases, the claimants successfully established that the municipality's act was of a proprietary, rather than governmental, nature, thereby prohibiting the
assertion of the immunity defense. 10 This distinction, however,
9 See, e.g., Belle v. New York City Transit Auth., 157 Misc. 2d 76, 595 N.Y.S.2d
856 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993) (holding Metropolitan Transportation Authority liable for criminal assault of passenger by third person despite absence of special relationship between parties).
10 See Lipsig, supra note 3, at 3. Dissatisfied with the "inequitable effects of sovereign immunity, [the judiciary] created exceptions to the general immunity rule...
which permitted the imposition of tort liability for failure of a municipality adequately to perform its 'proprietary' functions." Krause, supra note 1, at 504; see also
Laraine Pacheco, Comment, The New York State Court of Appeals Flunks the Governmental-ProprietaryImmunity Test in Denying Recovery to Teachers in Marilyn S. v.
City of New York and Bonner v. City of New York, 56 BRooK L. REV. 265, 266 n.6
(1990) ("A municipality is immune from tort liability when exercising a governmental
function, but subject to the same degree of liability as a private corporation... when
engaged in proprietary functions."). Historically, functions which could only be performed by a municipality were denoted governmental functions, while activities that
could be performed by either a private corporation or the municipality were classified
as proprietary functions. See Lloyd v. City of New York, 5 N.Y. 369 (1851). "The governmental-proprietary distinction owe[s] its existence to the dual nature of the municipal corporation." Owens v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 644 (1980).
The first municipal tort liability case to distinguish between a public entity's exercise of governmental and proprietary functions was Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3
Hill 531 (N.Y. 1842), which held the city liable for its negligent construction of a dam,
categorizing it as a proprietary function. For a detailed account of the municipal corporation law, see generally HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER:
THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK INAmEiUcAN LAW, 1730-1870 (1983). A
different rule of general liability for negligence is applied when the enterprise acts for
its own corporate benefit. Owens, 445 U.S. at 645 n.27; Popplestone v. New York City
Transit Auth., N.Y. L.J., Mar. 6, 1990, at 22, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Mar. 5,
1990). In Popplestone,the court found that the TA was acting in its proprietary capacity when it locked an exit gate that led to the street from the subway platform stairway, causing the plaintiff to be trapped in the exit. Id. Thus, the TA was not shielded
from immunity under the governmental immunity doctrine. Id.; see also Belle, 157
Misc. 2d at 81, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 859-60 (holding TA liable for assault of passenger by
third person, absent special relationship, because TA's failure to lock subway gate
leading to inoperable entrance involved proprietary function). These cases successfully distinguished a public entity's act as occurring in a proprietary capacity rather
than in a governmental capacity.
When advanced, however, the governmental-proprietary distinction has seldom
prevailed because the scope of governmental action entitled to immunity has often
been interpreted broadly. See Lennon v. Long Island R.R., N.Y. L.J., Mar. 5, 1993, at
31, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Queens County Mar. 5, 1993) (finding that lapses of proper maintenance implicates governmental function); see also Bonner v. City of New York, 73
N.Y.2d 930, 536 N.E.2d 1147, 539 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1989) (concluding duty to repair broken gate and provide adequate levels of security in schoolyard is governmental function); Rivera v. New York City Transit Auth., 184 A.D.2d 417, 585 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1st
Dep't 1992) (holding duty to provide proper lighting does not involve proprietary func-
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has been widely criticized for lacking a feasible standard to use in
classifying municipal functions into either unprotected or immune
activities.'
Recently, in Clingerv. New York City TransitAuthority, 2 the
Appellate Division, First Department, held that the TA may be
found liable for the assault of a passenger by a third party, despite
the absence of a special relationship between it and the claimant.' 3 The court concluded that summary judgment is inappropriate when the claimant has shown that the TA's negligence was a
substantial cause of the events which resulted in injury.14 Applying the governmental-proprietary distinction, Justice Tom, writing for the court, ruled that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the TA, because a governmental entity
may be held liable in negligence if it affirmatively facilitates the
commission of a crime while acting in its proprietary capacity.'5
In Clinger, despite knowing that an attack was likely to occur, the
TA negligently positioned construction material in the tunnel connecting the PATH station in a manner that invited and facilitated
the assault of a passenger. 16 While walking through the six-block
tion); Calero v. New York City Transit Auth., 168 A.D.2d 659, 563 N.Y.S.2d 109 (2d
Dep't 1990), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 864, 586 N.E.2d 61, 578 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1991)
(determining TA's duty to lock subway platform gate did not comprise proprietary
function).
11 Thus, "[iun a period marked by a constant expansion of governmental activities
... it is perhaps too much to expect that the judicial pronouncements marking the
boundaries of state immunity should present a completely logical pattern." Helvering
v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 419 (1938); see Ruth Cook, Comment, Postscript:Tracing
the GovernmentalProprietaryTest, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 561, 584 (1984) (reviewing status of governmental-proprietary system of classification and indicating courts' reluctance to abandon test despite criticism of standard); see also Duncan Kennedy, The
Stages of the Decline of the Public/PrivateDistinction,130 U. PA. L. REv. 1349 (1982)
(discussing what legal distinction must be possessed to be successful); Elizabeth
Mensch, Hartog'sNew York and the Ideology ofPublic and Private,1986 Wis. L. REv.
571, 578 (book review) ("It has now become relatively commonplace to demonstrate
the incoherence of the distinction between public and private... [it] is like beating a
dead horse.").
12 201 A.D.2d 236, 615 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1st Dep't), leave to appeal granted, 208
A.D.2d 1182, 618 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1st Dep't 1994).
13 Id.
14 Id. at 240, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 372.
15 Id. at 239-40, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 371; see Popplestone v. New York City Transit
Auth., N.Y. L.J., Mar. 6, 1990, at 22, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Mar. 5, 1990) (finding that "allegation of an affirmative act of negligence states a viable cause of action"
because, as enunciated in Weiner, creating dangerous condition is proprietary act beyond scope of immunity).
16 Clinger v. New York City Transit Auth., 201 A.D.2d at 238, 615 N.Y.S.2d at
371. The plaintiff initially alleged that the TA failed to maintain proper security, per-
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long pedestrian tunnel leading to the subway station, the claimant was grabbed from behind by an unknown male assailant and
dragged into seclusion behind a large metal plate positioned vertically against the tunnel wall.17 At the height of rush hour, the
plaintiff was robbed, brutally raped, and beaten behind the plate
which shielded the attack from the view of passersby.1 8 Consequently, the claimant sued the TA claiming it negligently stored
the construction material in an area of the tunnel that was known
as a location of continuous, violent criminal activity.1 9 The court
held that "[t]he [TA's] act of placing the construction material,
debris and the metal plate at the site of the attack was purely a
routine act integrally related to the renovation project undertaken
by the Authority in the capacity of a proprietary function."20
The First Department implicitly refused to extend the TA's
grant of governmental immunity to a situation in which the TA,
acting in its proprietary capacity, affirmatively facilitated an assault on a passenger.2 1 In this instance, although the TA generally engaged in governmental activity, the plaintiff's injury arose
mitted or allowed dangerous persons to use the Sixth Avenue Tunnel, and neglected
to take the appropriate measures to protect passengers. Id. She later explained her
allegations in a bill of particulars, asserting that the TA, by storing the construction
materials in such a manner, affrmatively created a dangerous condition which allowed her to be assaulted without detection. Id.; see infra note 19 (discussing history
of criminal activity in tunnel).
17 Clinger, 201 A.D.2d at 237, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 370. While undertaking renovations, the TA stored construction materials, including the vertically positioned metal
plate, in this secluded passageway. Id.
18 Id.

19 Id. at 238, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 370. There had been over 30 felonies, including two
rapes, committed in that same tunnel during the year prior to the claimant's attack.
Id. In fact, the Transit Police recommended closing the tunnel immediately after the
two rapes occurred, but the TA neglected to act upon this recommendation. Id.
20 Id. at 239, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 371; cf. Miller v. State, 62 N.Y.2d 506, 467 N.E.2d
493, 478 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1984) (noting difficulty delineating municipality's function as
governmental or proprietary).
21 Clinger, 201 A.D.2d at 239, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 371. See generally Cook, supra note
11, at 561 (noting that court decisions have "advocated a policy ofjudicial noninterference with the traditionally accepted role of local government and imposed liability
only when it was perceived that the local government had entered the private sector
sphere of activity"). The critical issue in determining whether a municipality is immune is whether the injury occurs while it is acting in a governmental or proprietary
capacity. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 644-48 (1980). Absent a statutory waiver, a municipality is immune from suit for its exercise of a governmental
function, but is held to the same standard of liability as a private entity for its proprietary acts. Id. at 644-45.
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out of its performance of a proprietary function.2 2 Proprietary
acts are not immune from liability because they do not involve a
legislative-executive function:
It is the specific act or omission out of which the injury is claimed
to have arisen and the capacity in which that act or failure to act
occurred which governs liability, not whether the agency involved is engaged generally in proprietary activity or is in control
of the location in which the injury occurred.2"
The TA's "control, maintenance and repair of [its] premises"
involved proprietary functions and thus were not subject to governmental immunity.24 Justice Sullivan, in his dissenting opinion, argued that, absent a special relationship, there is no such
rule stripping the TA of its immunity when it acts in a proprietary
rather than a governmental capacity. 5 It is submitted, however,
that the First Department was correct in holding that the TA may
be found liable for the attack on plaintiff because "Weiner [v. Metropolitan TransportationAuthority] did not ... absolve publicly
owned common carriers from liability for assaults on their passengers by third parties in all cases."2 6 Rather, Weiner held that the
scope of the TA's immunity from liability rests upon consideration
of both the specific act or omission allegedly giving rise to the injury and the capacity in which the act or failure to act occurred.
22 Clinger, 201 AD.2d at 239, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 371. A critical factor in determining municipal liability appears to be whether the injury occurred during the municipality's exercise of a governmental or a proprietary act. See Bockrath, supra note 2, at
1088.
23 Weiner v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 N.Y.2d 175, 182, 433 N.E.2d 124,
127, 448 N.Y.S.2d 141, 144 (1982) (citations omitted).
24 Clinger, 201 A.D.2d at 239, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 371. The court's determination
that the TA's maintenance and repair of the subway comprised a proprietary act is
consistent with prior case law. See, e.g., Krause, supra note 1, at 505 (labelling construction and maintenance of municipal water and light plants as proprietary acts).
25 Clinger, 201 A.D.2d at 243, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 373 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). Justice Sullivan maintained that, in the absence of a special relationship, the TA is immune for its failure to provide adequate police protection. Id. He further stated that

"[i]n any event, [Clinger's] 'premises defect' claim is no more than an argument that
the passageway would have been a much safer place had there been no construction
material .... [which] is, in effect,... [a] disguised police protection argument." Id.
Ultimately, he contended the argument "fails on the issue of proximate cause as being
too speculative as a matter of law." Id.
26 Crosland v. New York City Transit Auth., 68 N.Y.2d 165, 169, 498 N.E.2d 143,
145, 506 N.Y.S.2d 670, 672 (1986).
27 Weiner, 55 N.Y.2d at 182,433 N.E.2d at 127,448 N.Y.S.2d at 144. Distinguishing an act as either a proprietary or governmental act is far from a simple task. See
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955) (classifying governmentalproprietary distinction as "a quagmire that has long plagued the law"); Janice C. Grif-
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Although "the allocation of police resources implicates a governmental function for which a publicly owned carrier cannot be liable,"2 8 the plaintiff in Clinger alleged claims arising out of an act
other than the mere failure to allocate police resources 2 9 - the
TA's affirmative negligent act of positioning the metal plate in the
tunnel in such a manner that facilitated the commission of a
crime, despite knowing that one was virtually certain to occur. s0
Affirmative acts of negligence have been held to be beyond the
scope of Weiner and, thus, not protected by governmental immunity. 31 Since the TA created an unreasonable risk of harm to its
passengers, 32 it may be held liable for any natural and foreseeable
consequences of the dangerous condition it created.3"
When a municipal defendant acts in a proprietary capacity as
landlord, it may be held liable for injuries resulting from its negligence.3 4 Similarly, as a landowner, the TA had a duty to "maintain[ ] [its] property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all of
the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the
seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk."3 5
Although the public may derive a common benefit from the TA's
fith, Local Government Contracts: Escaping from the Governmental/Proprietary
Maze, 75 IowA L. REV. 277 (1990) (bisecting governmental-proprietary test); see also
Cook, supra note 11 (discussing incoherence of distinction between entity's governmental and proprietary functions); Krause, supra note 1, at 505-06 (arguing governmental-proprietary test often results in "artificial and inconsistent judicial distinctions"); cf. In re County of Monroe's Compliance, 72 N.Y.2d 338, 341, 530 N.E.2d 202,
203, 533 N.Y.S.2d 702, 703 (1988) (declining to use governmental-proprietary test in
land use cases in favor of "balancing of public interests").
28 Crosland, 68 N.Y.2d at 169, 498 N.E.2d at 144, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
29 See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text (discussing plaintiff's
allegations).
30 Clinger, 201 A.D.2d at 240, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
31 See Popplestone v. New York Transit Auth., N.Y. L.J., Mar. 6, 1990, at 22, col.
5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Mar. 5, 1990) (finding that affirmative act of negligence, such
as creating dangerous condition, is proprietary act beyond scope of Weiner immunity);
see also Belle v. New York City Transit Auth., 157 Misc. 2d 76, 595 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1993) (holding TA liable for affirmative negligent act of misrepresenting closed subway entrance as open because it facilitated attack on plaintiff).
32 Clinger, 201 A.D.2d at 240, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
33 Id.; see also Kush v. City of Buffalo, 59 N.Y.2d 26, 33, 449 N.E.2d 725, 729, 462
N.Y.S.2d 831, 835, (1983) (holding defendant liable if intervening act by third party is
natural foreseeable consequence of defendant's negligent act).
34 Miller v. State, 62 N.Y.2d 506, 511, 467 N.E.2d 493, 496, 478 N.Y.S.2d 829, 832
(1984).
35 Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 352 N.E.2d 868, 872, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564,
568 (1976) (quoting Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, 469 F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973)).
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renovation work, the construction may be classified as a proprietary act since "[a] governmental entity's conduct may fall along a
continuum of responsibility to individuals and society deriving
from its governmental and proprietary functions."3 6 Clinger correctly found that the TA's acts did not involve a governmental
function because there was no sophisticated policy decision involved in the allocation of limited resources. Instead, the TA's
specific affirmative act clearly fell on the proprietary end of the
continuum.
It is asserted that although the Clinger court appropriately
found that the TA's "control, maintenance and repair of [its] premises " 3 7 involved a proprietary function, it failed to delineate what
made these acts "proprietary."3 1 Instead, the court merely stated
that "[p]roprietary functions would include the control, maintenance and repair of the premises of the Authority in its capacity
as owner."3 9 It should have elaborated. Although judicial approval of the plaintiff's right to redress for injuries incurred as a
result of municipal misconduct is commendable, Clingerwill probably provide little assistance to the practitioner since it is quite
likely the holding, if upheld on appeal,4 ° will be confined to the
specific facts of the case. One possible solution, as advocated by
many critics of the governmental-proprietary test, is the implementation of uniform legislation in the area of municipal liability.41 Such legislative action could equalize the inequities that
plague this area of the law while addressing conflicting public pol36 Miller v. State, 62 N.Y.2d at 511-12, 467 N.E.2d at 496, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 832
(holding municipal defendant liable in its capacity as landlord because its failure to
keep dormitory door locked was proprietary function).
37 Clinger, 201 A.D.2d at 240, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
38 The court merely states that the distinction is "relevant to liability for negligence claims," without indicating why it classifies the TA's act as a proprietary function. Id. at 239, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 371. Since the Appellate Division, First Department,
was merely revising an order for summary judgment, it should have provided the trial
court with more guidance.
39 Id.
40 The New York Court of Appeals granted the TA leave to appeal the First Department's opinion. Clinger v. New York City Transit Auth., 208 A.D.2d 1182, 618
N.Y.S.2d 526 (1994).
41 See Cook, supra note 11, at 584 (suggesting proposed legislation in area of municipal liability evidences progress towards resolution of blurred governmental-proprietary standard); Pacheco, supra note 10, at 269 (advocating reformulation and clarification of legal standard used in determining when governmental immunity rule
may be invoked).
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icies in determining whether an act is "governmental" or
"proprietary."
Pamela McCormack
Editor'sNote: Before this issue went to print,the New York Court
of Appeals in Clinger v. New York City Transit Authority, N.Y.
L.J., May 5, 1995, at 28, col. 3 (May 4, 1995) (mem.), reversed the
First Department's holding and granted summary judgment for
the TransitAuthority. The court found the TA's act to be predominantly governmental, and stated that the plaintifffailed to establish that the location of the metal plate, rather than inadequate
police protection, was the proximate cause of her injuries.

